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We show, both analytically and numerically, that erroneous data transmission generates a global
transition within a competitive population playing the Minority Game on a network. This transition,
which resembles a phase transition, is driven by a ‘temporal symmetry breaking’ in the global
outcome series. The phase boundary, which is a function of the network connectivity p and the
error probability q, is described quantitatively by the Crowd-Anticrowd theory.
The study of Complex Adaptive Systems is enabling
Physics to expand its boundaries into a range of non-
traditional areas within the biological, informational and
socio-economic communities. Since these areas are of-
ten rich in empirical data, they also offer Physics a new
testing ground for theories of Complex Systems, and for
non-equilibrium statistical mechanics in general [1]. It is
widely recognized [2] that Arthur’s multi-agent El Farol
Bar Problem (EFBP) [3] embodies the interacting, many-
body nature of many real-world Complex Systems. In
particular, a binary representation of the EFBP, namely
the Minority Game (MG) [4, 5, 6, 7], plays the role of a
new ‘Ising Model’ for theoretical physics.
Despite widespread interest among physicists in bio-
logical, informational and socio-economic networks [8],
researchers have only just started considering the effect
of such networks in the MG and EFBP [7]. It has so
far been assumed that any information shared between
agents is always perfectly accurate. However, real-world
Complex Systems do not operate at such levels of per-
fection. Furthermore, informational networks might be
used by agents to spy and mislead rather than to benefit
others. This raises the following question: what is the ef-
fect of networks within a competitive population such as
the MG, where the information transmitted is corrupted?
Here we show analytically and numerically, that er-
roneous data transmission generates an abrupt global
transition within a competitive, networked population
playing the Minority Game. This phase-like transition is
driven by a ‘temporal symmetry breaking’ in the global
outcome series. The Crowd-Anticrowd theory, which ac-
counts for the many-body (i.e. many-agent) correlations
inherent in the system, provides a quantitative yet phys-
ically intuitive explanation of this phase transition.
Our model consists of N objects or ‘agents’ who re-
peatedly compete to be in a minority: for example, com-
muters striving to choose the least crowded of two routes.
The agents can be any form of adaptive object, e.g. bio-
logical or mechanical, and our general setup has potential
application to a wide range of problems in the biological,
informational and social sciences. The minority rule can
also be generalized [5]. At each timestep t, each agent
decides between action +1 meaning to choose option ‘1’,
and action −1 meaning to choose option ‘0’. The win-
ning (i.e. minority) outcome at each timestep is ‘0’ or
‘1’. Each agent decides his actions in light of (i) global
information which takes the form of the history of the m
most recent global outcomes, and (ii) local information
obtained via the cluster to which he is connected, if any.
Such connections may be physically tangible (e.g. a tele-
phone or Internet link, or biological structure) or physi-
cally intangible (e.g. a wireless communication channel,
or biochemical pathway). Adaptation is introduced by
randomly assigning S strategies to each agent. Each of
the 22
m
possible strategies is a bit-string of length 2m
defining an action (+1 or −1) for each of the 2m possi-
ble global outcome histories µ(t) [4, 5]. For m = 2 for
example, there are 22
m=2
= 16 possible strategies and
22 = 4 possible global outcome histories: µ(t) = 00, 01,
10 and 11. Strategies which predicted the winning (los-
ing) action at a given timestep are assigned (deducted)
one point.
Agents use the connections they have, if any, to gather
information from other agents. For simplicity we assume
a random network between agents, fixed at the beginning
of the game. The connection between any two agents ex-
ists with a probability p, hence each agent is on average
connected to p(N − 1) others. At a given timestep t, and
with a given global history µ(t), each agent takes the ac-
tion predicted by the highest-scoring strategy among his
own and those of the agents to which he is connected.
The parameter q is the probability that an error arises
in the information he gathers from his cluster. Alterna-
tively, q can be viewed as the weight an agent places on
the information gathered from his cluster. For example,
if the action of the best strategy in his cluster is +1, the
agent records this as a −1 with probability q (and vice
versa for a best action −1). The information transmis-
sion has been corrupted with probability q. Any agent
with a higher-scoring strategy than those of his neigh-
bors at a given timestep, is unaffected by this error –
the only source of stochasticity which might affect him
is the standard coin-toss used to break any ties between
his own strategies [5]. In contrast to the agents’ ‘on-site’
stochastic strategy selection arising in the Thermal Mi-
nority Game (TMG) [6, 9], the stochasticity associated
with q in our game depends on the agents’ connectivity.
We now investigate the effects of this microscopic
connection-driven data error on the system’smacroscopic
dynamics. We shall build an analytic theory based on
the Crowd-Anticrowd theory [5] which incorporates the
many-agent (many-body) correlations arising in the sys-
2FIG. 1: Fluctuation in excess demand, σD, as a function of
the error-probability q and the network connectivity p. (a)
Numerical results averaged over 300 runs, each with 105 iter-
ations. (b) Analytic Crowd-Anticrowd theory. At high q, the
two branches in (a) correspond to different dynamical attrac-
tor states, while the single branch in (b) represents an effective
average (see text). The dotted line in (b) at p = 0.25, illus-
trates the modified analytical results for the upper branch if
one assumes some knowledge of this branch’s global output
series. Parameters: m = 1, S = 2, and N = 101.
FIG. 2: Numerical results for individual runs, showing the
fluctuation in excess demand, σD, around q = 0.5. Parame-
ters as in Fig. 1.
tem’s strategy space as a result of the dynamics in the
history space. To a very good approximation, we can
replace the Full Strategy Space by a Reduced Strategy
Space (RSS) [4] which provides a minimal basis set of
strategies for the system [5]. The appropriate choice for
the RSS depends on the relative frequency of visits to the
2m histories. With all histories visited equally often, the
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FIG. 3: Contour map version of Figure 1. Contours corre-
spond to a constant value of σD as a function of the error-
probability q and the network connectivity p. (a) Numerical
results. (b) Analytic Crowd-Anticrowd theory. For clarity,
only the upper branch of the numerical results is shown for
the high-q phase.
RSS comprises a total of 2P = 2.2m strategies [4]. As in
previous MG work [4], we will focus on the typical fluctu-
ations in the excess demand D(t) away from its optimal
value as a function of p and q. The excess demand D(t)
at timestep t is given by:
D(t) = n−1(t)− n+1(t) =
K=2P∑
K=1
aKnK(t) (1)
where n+1(t) (n−1(t)) is the number of agents taking
action +1 (−1); aK = ±1 is the action predicted by
strategy K in response to history µ(t) and nK(t) is the
number of agents using strategyK at time t. K labels the
K’th highest scoring strategy whileK = 2P+1−K labels
the anti-correlated strategy. In the non-networked MG
at low m, D(t) exhibits large, crowd-driven fluctuations
while µ(t) follows a quasi-deterministic Eulerian Trail in
which all histories {µ(t)} are visited equally [10]. Hence,
the time-averages 〈n−1(t)〉 = 〈n+1(t)〉 yielding 〈D(t)〉 =
0 which is the optimal value for D(t). We continue this
focus on smallm here, since we are interested in the effect
of q on these crowd-driven fluctuations. We will assume
that the combined effect of averaging over t for a given
Ψ (where Ψ is a given realization of the initial strategy
allocation matrix [5]), and averaging over Ψ, will have the
same effect as averaging over all histories. This is true
for the non-networked MG, and produces a mean D(t) of
zero. Hence the fluctuation (i.e. standard deviation) of
3the excess demand, σD, is given by:
σ2D =
〈
P∑
K=1
(
nK(t)− nK(t)
)
2
〉
t,Ψ
≈
P∑
K=1
(
nmeanK − n
mean
K
)
2
.
(2)
We have used the orthogonality properties of the vec-
tors with elements aK where K = 1, 2, . . . , 2P [5]. Since
nK(t) will generally fluctuate around some mean value
nmeanK , we have also written nK(t) = n
mean
K + ǫK(t) and
assumed that the fluctuation terms {ǫK(t)} are uncorre-
lated stochastic processes. In Eq. (2),
nmeanK = nK + n→K − nK→ − n
conn
K (3)
and similarly for nmean
K
, where:
(1) nK is the mean number of agents whose own best
strategy is actually the K’th highest scoring strategy in
the game [5]:
nK = N
[(
1−
K − 1
2m+1
)S
−
(
1−
K
2m+1
)S ]
. (4)
(2) n→K is the mean number of agents who only possess
strategies worse (i.e. lower scoring) than K, but who will
use strategy K due to connections they have to one or
more agents who each possess strategy K but no better:
n→K =
(
1− q
)
· nq
→K + q · n
q
→K
(5)
where
nq
→K
=
[∑
J>K
nJ
][(
1−p
)∑
G<K
nG][
1−
(
1−p
)nK ]
(6)
with nq
→K
being obtained from Eq. (6) by setting K →
K = 2P + 1−K.
(3) nK→ is the mean number of agents who possess strat-
egy K, but who will nevertheless use a strategy better
than K due to connections:
nK→ =
(
1− q
)
· nqK→ + q · n
q
K→
(7)
where
n
q
K→ = nK
[
1−
(
1− p
)∑
G<K
nG ]
(8)
and similarly for nq
K→
.
(4) nconnK accounts for the situation in which an agent is
connected to other agents with the same highest scoring
strategy K as him. q therefore gives the probability that
this agent will take the opposite action to strategy K:
nconnK = q ·nK
[
1−
(
1−p
)nK]
−q ·n
K
[
1−
(
1−p
)n
K
]
. (9)
Figure 1 compares the numerical and analytical results
for σD, which is the standard deviation in excess demand.
The agreement is remarkable given the complexity of σD
as a function of p and q. As the ‘noise’ level q increases,
the system undergoes a change in regime at a critical
connectivity p defined by the critical boundary Ccrit(q, p).
Moving across Ccrit(q, p), the symmetry in the global out-
come string is spontaneously broken in a manner rem-
iniscent of a phase transition. Specifically, the global
outcome series changes from the low-q phase where it re-
sembles the period-4 Eulerian Trail . . . 00110011 . . ., to
a high-q phase where it comprises two distinct branches
(see Fig. 1(a)). Figure 2 shows individual runs near
the critical noise threshold. The higher branch corre-
sponds to a period-2 global outcome series . . . 1010 . . .
which is antiferromagnetic if we denote 0 (1) as a spa-
tial spin up (down) as opposed to a temporal outcome.
The lower branch corresponds to the period-1 series of
‘frozen’ outcomes . . . 0000 . . . or . . . 1111 . . ., i.e. ferro-
magnetic. In this high-q phase, the system will ‘choose’
one of these two global outcome branches spontaneously,
as a result of the type and number of links each agent
has. This symmetry-breaking of the global outcome se-
ries along the channel of minimum fluctuation in Fig. 1,
Ccrit(q, p), originates in the internal coupling between the
history dynamics, the strategy space and the individual
agent networks. Because of the initial strategy allocation
and connections, many agents will have an in-built bias
towards one of the two possible actions and hence act
in a deterministic or ‘decided’ way at a given timestep.
However, there exist a few ‘undecided’ agents who need
to toss an unbiased coin to decide between the equally
balanced signals they gather from their local network. It
is the fluctuations of these few ‘undecided’ agents who
then push the system onto a particular branch.
We now discuss two technical details. First, there are
many ties in strategy scores at very small m, and hence
many tie-break coin-tosses. This means that the fluctua-
tion terms {ǫK(t)} can no longer be ignored. The m = 1
surface in Fig. 1(b) was therefore produced by averaging
over the 2.2m = 4 timesteps in the Eulerian Trail [10]. In
other words, the double-average in Eq. (2) was evaluated
over the 2.2m = 4 timesteps in the Eulerian Trail. When
a tie-break between the strategies K = 1 and K = 2
arises at one of the four timesteps, one replaces nmeanK=1 and
nmeanK=2 by
1
2
(nmeanK=1 + n
mean
K=2 ) at that timestep. Likewise,
for tie-breaks between any other K and K ′. In this way,
the average over the Eulerian Trail is easily evaluated
analytically. As m increases, there are more timesteps
over which one must average (i.e. 2P = 2.2m timesteps).
However, since ties also become less frequent as m in-
creases, one can simply ignore them without significant
4loss of accuracy (see Ref. [5] in which good agreement is
obtained for the non-networked MG for a wide range ofm
values without considering ties). Second, the theory has
assumed the non-networked MG result that the dynam-
ics follow the Eulerian Trail. Only one branch therefore
emerges in Fig. 1(b) at high q, appearing like some effec-
tive average over the global output series for all branches
in Fig. 1(a). If instead one uses knowledge of the actual
global output series for these separate branches (i.e. anti-
ferromagnetic or ferromagnetic), then results even closer
to Fig. 1(a) can be obtained. This is illustrated at one
particular p by the dotted line in Fig. 1(b).
Figure 3 provides a contour plot of σD around the min-
imum. The black contour, centered around the critical
curve Ccrit(q, p), effectively separates the two different
regimes of behavior. The low σD values around Ccrit(q, p)
can be easily understood using the physical picture pro-
vided by the Crowd-Anticrowd theory: the stochasticity
induced by q (i.e. noise) breaks up the size of the Crowds
using a given strategy K, while simultaneously increas-
ing the size of the Anticrowds using the opposite strategy
K. It is remarkable that a linear increase in the ‘noise’
q gives rise to such a non-linear variation in σD. Us-
ing the analytic expressions in this paper, an equation
for Ccrit(q, p) can be obtained – however we do not in-
clude it because it is cumbersome. As noted above, the
theory neglects a full treatment of the dynamical fluc-
tuations around nmeanK . Hence, the theory overestimates
the Crowd-Anticrowd cancellation arising in Eq. (2) and
thus slightly underestimates σD in the neighborhood of
Ccrit(q, p) (compare Figs. 3(a) and 3(b)). As p increases,
Ccrit(q, p) becomes less dependent on the connectivity p
since more and more agents join the same network clus-
ter. For p >∼ 0.05 the system passes the percolation
threshold and hence is dominated by a giant, common
cluster.
Finally, we note that if instead of introducing er-
rors into the local transmission of information, as in the
present work, one induces noise at the global level via
errors in the global outcome series, the results for the
excess demand are reasonably similar to those presented
here. Our results raise the interesting possibility whereby
imperfect information transmission could be induced at
the local and/or global level in order to achieve a desired
change in the macroscopic fluctuations within biological,
informational or socio-economic systems.
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